Enhanced fear learning for fear-relevant stimuli has been demonstrated in procedures with adults in the laboratory. Three experiments investigated the effect of stimulus fear-relevance on vicarious fear learning in children (aged 6 -11 years). Pictures of stimuli with different levels of fear-relevance (flowers, caterpillars, snakes, worms, and Australian marsupials) were presented alone or together with scared faces. In line with previous studies, children's fear beliefs and avoidance preferences increased for stimuli they had seen with scared faces. However, in contrast to evidence with adults, learning was mostly similar for all stimulus types irrespective of fear-relevance. The results support a proposal that stimulus preparedness is bypassed when children observationally learn threat-related information from adults.
Anxiety is one of the most common psychological disorders of childhood (Cartwright-Hatton, McNicol, & Doubleday, 2006) . It often has a negative impact on children's social and educational functioning and persists into adulthood (Cartwright-Hatton, 2006) . Fears are distributed nonrandomly in the population; for example, fears of certain animals and natural events are more common than other types of fear (Agras, Sylvester, & Oliveau, 1969; Merckelbach, De Jong, Muris, & Van den Hout, 1996) . This uneven distribution is typically explained using evolutionary-based theories such as preparedness theory (Seligman, 1970 (Seligman, , 1971 . Proponents of this theory argue that because certain evolutionarily "fear-relevant" stimuli threatened our ancestors' survival, natural selection favored the genes of those who avoided them. Consequently, compared to fear-irrelevant stimuli, fear learning for fearrelevant stimuli will: 1) occur more readily; 2) be more robust; and 3) be less cognitive/rational because it is mediated by parts of the brain that developed early in human evolution (Mineka & Öhman, 2002; Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Seligman, 1970 Seligman, , 1971 . Selective associations for fear-relevant stimuli are demonstrated in the laboratory when there is evidence of either faster learning (learning in fewer trials), a larger conditioned response (CR), or superior resistance to extinction.
Children can learn to fear a stimulus by observing someone else responding fearfully to it in a process referred to as vicarious (or "observational") learning (Rachman, 1977) . Recent experimental evidence indicates that vicarious learning is a viable pathway to fear in childhood. Toddlers (12-14 months) learn to be more wary of strangers after observing their mothers acting in a socially anxious manner with them (De Rosnay, Cooper, Tsigaras, & Murray, 2006) . Similar effects have been found for animal fears: Gerull and Rapee (2002) demonstrated that 15-20 month-old toddlers show fear and avoidance for fear-relevant stimuli (rubber snakes or spiders) after observing their mothers display negative (fearful or disgusted) facial expressions toward them. Conversely, observationally learned fear can be prevented if children have positive maternal modeling experience with the stimulus beforehand (Egliston & Rapee, 2007) . Askew and Field (2007) showed that the fear beliefs of children (7-9 years old) for previously unknown animals (Australian marsupials) increased after they saw them with pictures of scared faces and remained elevated for at least one week. Fear-related attitudes for these animals were also indirectly detected postlearning and again 3 months later using affective priming to avoid potential demand characteristics associated with direct self-report. Askew and Field also found that children were more cautious about approaching boxes they believed contained the animal they had seen alongside scared faces. These experimental studies with children demonstrate that vicarious learning leads to changes in two of Lang's (1968) three anxiety response systems: the language behavior system and the behavioral avoidance response system. Furthermore, experiments with children (Askew & Field, 2007 Askew, Kessock-Philip, & Field, 2008) , adults (Olsson & Phelps, 2004; Olsson, Nearing, & Phelps, 2007) , and monkeys (Mineka & Cook, 1993) indicate that vicarious learning can be conceptualized as associative learning in which the object of learning is the conditioned stimulus (CS) and the model's behavior is the unconditioned stimulus (US). Also notable is that explicit awareness of the CS-US contingencies does not appear necessary for vicarious learning in adults (Olsson & Phelps, 2004) or children (Askew & Field, 2007) .
Earlier experimental studies with monkeys also offer compelling evidence for selective associations being made through vicarious learning. A series of studies by Mineka, Cook, and colleagues showed that non-snake-fearful rhesus monkeys can rapidly acquire persistent fear of snakes after exposure to monkeys responding fearfully to snakes (e.g., Cook & Mineka, 1989 , 1990 Mineka & Cook, 1986 , 1993 Mineka, Davidson, Cook, & Keir, 1984) . Although nonprimates are known to acquire avoidance behavior for fear-irrelevant stimuli relatively easily via observational learning (e.g., Del Russo, 1975; Kohn, 1976; Mason & Reidinger, 1982) this learning was found only for fear-relevant stimuli such as snakes and not for fear-irrelevant stimuli such as flowers (Cook & Mineka, 1989 , 1990 . In contrast, Dubi, Rapee, Emerton, and Schniering (2008) found no significant differences in toddlers' observational learning for fear-relevant (snakes and spiders) and fear-irrelevant (flowers and mushrooms) stimuli using Gerull and Rapee's (2002) modeling procedure.
Although a wealth of evidence demonstrates selective associations in direct conditioning laboratory procedures (see Davey, 1995; Mineka & Öhman, 2002; Öhman & Mineka, 2001 , for an overview) equivalent vicarious learning studies are relatively scarce. Askew and Field (2007) established fear-related vicarious learning in children for Australian marsupials (the quoll, quokka, and cuscus). The current experiments used Askew and Field's procedure to compare vicarious learning for these animals with fear-relevant and -irrelevant stimuli. In Experiment 1 vicarious learning for quolls and cuscuses was compared to learning for stimuli (flowers) traditionally used as fear-irrelevant CSs (e.g., Cook & Mineka, 1989; Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; Öhman & Soares, 1998) . Experiment 2 compared learning for the two marsupials with learning for novel stimuli (uncommon caterpillars) that were similar to those typically used as fear-relevant conditioned stimuli (CSs). A final experiment compared vicarious learning for the marsupials with learning for more well-established fear-relevant stimuli (snakes) and another set of stimuli sharing perceptual similarities (worms).
Experiment 1
All experiments used Askew and Field's (2007) vicarious learning procedure: children saw each CS (marsupial, flower, caterpillar, snake, or worm) presented either together with scared faces (USs) or alone (control condition). Thus, during two counterbalanced within-subject conditions, children saw one "scared-paired" and one "unpaired" CS. Self-reported fear beliefs for CSs were measured before and after vicarious learning using the Fear Beliefs Questionnaire (FBQ: Field & Lawson, 2003) . Children's avoidance preferences were also determined using the "nature reserve task" (Field & Storksen-Coulson, 2007) .
Method
Participants. Sixty-four children (28 boys, 36 girls) aged between 6.25 and 10.08 years (M ϭ 101.06 months, SD ϭ 12.35 months) were recruited from southwest London, United Kingdom. All parents gave informed consent and children gave verbal assent.
Children were randomly assigned to either the marsupial (n ϭ 32, 14 girls, 18 boys) or flower (n ϭ 32, 22 girls, 10 boys) condition.
Materials. Marsupials and flowers. Six color pictures (each measuring 400 ϫ 400 pixels) of two Australian marsupials, three of a quoll and three of a cuscus, were used as unfamiliar CSs. In addition, six color pictures (each measuring approximately 400 ϫ 300 pixels) of flowers, three pictures of red avens and three of dotted loosestrife, were used. These flowers were chosen because they are likely to be relatively unknown to U.K. children (compared to say roses or daffodils).
Faces. Ten (5 males, 5 females) portrait photographs (400 pixels wide by 385 to 494 pixels high) of scared faces were used as USs. Pictures were taken from the NimStim Face Stimulus Set (Tottenham, Borscheid, Ellertsen, Marcus, & Nelson, 2002) .
Fear Beliefs Questionnaire (FBQ). The FBQ (Field & Lawson, 2003 ) was used to measure children's fear-related beliefs for CSs. Eight identical questions (four reverse-scored) determined children's feelings about the marsupials and flowers (e.g., "Would you be happy if you found a cuscus/quoll/red avens/dotted loosestrife in your garden?"). Children responded on a 5-point Likert response scale (0 ϭ 'No, not at all,' 1 ϭ 'No, not really,' 2 ϭ 'Don't know/Neither,' 3 ϭ 'Yes, probably,' 4 ϭ 'Yes, definitely'). Internal consistency was moderate before learning: Cronbach's alpha ϭ .65 (Quoll subscale), .55 (Cuscus subscale), .68 (Dotted Loosestrife subscale) and .78 (Red Avens subscale); and high after learning: ␣ ϭ .88, .86, .93, and .93, respectively. Nature reserve task. Children's approach-avoidance cognitions were determined using Field and Storksen-Coulson's (2007) nature reserve task. Originally adapted from the Family System Task (Gehring & Marti, 2000; Gehring & Wyler, 1986) , in the nature reserve task children are asked to imagine that a 45 cm ϫ 60 cm green rectangular board is a nature reserve. They are visiting the reserve and should place themselves (represented by a Playmobil figure of the same gender as the child) where they would most like to be in the park. Photos of the two CSs were at either end of the board: depending on the group to which the child was assigned, either one flower or one marsupial at each end. The board was otherwise empty except for a few trees around the edges so that there would be nothing for their figure to "hide behind." The distance from the center of the child's figure to the center of each CS was measured to determine relative approach-avoidance preferences for each stimulus.
Procedure. The experimenter explained to children what they would be asked to do and that they could leave the study at any time. Children gave verbal assent. The procedure was computerized using software that was custom written (by the last author) in Visual Basic.net. The software was run on a Hewlett Packard 6720s laptop computer with a 15Љ monitor.
Children were randomly assigned to one of two CS groups, "marsupial" or "flower," and the first FBQ was administered. Next, during vicarious learning children saw CS images (one of two flowers or marsupials depending on their CS group) together with scared face images on a computer screen (a "scared-paired" trial). The other flower or marsupial CS was presented alone in a no-learning control condition (an "unpaired" trial). Children were informed that faces showed the person's response to encountering the CS. Children saw 20 trials in random order in a counterbalanced within-subject design. There were 10 scared-paired and 10 This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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unpaired trials, so that the marsupial group saw 10 marsupial-face trials and 10 marsupial-alone trials, and the flower group saw 10 flower-face and 10 flower-alone trials. One scared-paired trial consisted of a randomly chosen CS picture appearing alone on the screen for 1s followed by a further 1s together with a US face. In an unpaired trial the CS appeared on its own for 2s. The side of the screen that images appeared on was randomly determined. Between each trial there was a randomly determined 2s to 4s interval. Following vicarious learning the second FBQ and, finally, the nature reserve task were administered. Children were fully debriefed using puzzles, games, and correct information about the animals following the experiment.
Results
Effect sizes are reported as r where appropriate and otherwise as partial eta-squared ( p 2 ). Fear beliefs. A two-way 2 (pairing type: scared-paired vs. unpaired) ϫ 2 (CS type: marsupial vs. flower) mixed ANOVA was used to compare previcarious learning fear-belief scores. Fear beliefs for marsupials (M ϭ 1.73, SE ϭ 0.10) were significantly higher than those for flowers (M ϭ 1.17, SE ϭ 0.10), F(1, 62) ϭ 15.75, p Ͻ .001, r ϭ .45, before learning. Changes in average fear beliefs pre-to postvicarious learning were calculated for scaredpaired and unpaired animals (see Figure 1 ) and a two-way 2 (pairing type: scared-paired vs. unpaired) ϫ 2 (CS type: marsupial vs. flower) mixed ANOVA was performed on these scores. There was a significant main effect of pairing type on changes in fear beliefs, F(1, 62) ϭ 9.69, p ϭ .003, r ϭ .37. This shows the effect of fear-related vicarious learning generally: increases in fear beliefs for scared-paired CSs (prelearning: M ϭ 1.48, SD ϭ 0.69; postlearning: M ϭ 2.14, SD ϭ 1.13) were significantly greater than for unpaired CSs (prelearning: M ϭ 1.42, SD ϭ 0.71; postlearning: M ϭ 1.69, SD ϭ 0.99). In contrast, the main effect of CS type, F(1, 62) ϭ 0.68, p ϭ .41, r ϭ .10 and the pairing type ϫ CS type interaction, F(1, 62) ϭ 0.33, p ϭ .57, r ϭ .07, were nonsignificant. The lack of significant interaction indicates that fear-related learning was no different for marsupials and flowers and is unlikely to be due to lack of power given the very small effect size.
Correlational analyses indicated that there was no relationship between the age of children and increases in fear beliefs for scared-paired marsupials, r(30) ϭ .01, p ϭ .96, but increases in fear beliefs for scared-paired flowers were greater for older children, r(30) ϭ .38, p ϭ .031.
Avoidance preferences. Figure 2 shows the distances (in cm) from each CS that children placed a figure representing them in the nature reserve task. Distance measurements were analyzed using a two-way 2 (pairing type: scared-paired vs. unpaired) ϫ 2 (CS type: marsupial vs. flower) mixed ANOVA. The main effect of pairing type was significant, F(1, 62) ϭ 41.71, p Ͻ .001, r ϭ .66. This demonstrates that children would prefer to avoid CSs seen with scared faces (M ϭ 42.10, SD ϭ 13.32) compared to CSs seen alone (M ϭ 20.62, SD ϭ 13.47). The main effect of CS type, F(1, 62) ϭ 0.24, p ϭ .63, r ϭ .06, and the pairing type ϫ CS type interaction, F(1, 62) ϭ 0.03, p ϭ .86, r ϭ .02, were nonsignificant, indicating no significant difference between marsupials and flowers in vicariously acquired avoidance. Again, the low effect size for this interaction suggests that the effect is close to zero and therefore unimportant. A final correlational analysis found no relationship between age and the distance children placed their figure from scared-paired marsupials, r ϭ .06, or flowers, r ϭ Ϫ.28.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 showed that postvicarious learning increases in children's fear beliefs and avoidance preferences were similar for fear-irrelevant flower stimuli and the Australian marsupials used by Askew and Field (2007; . A second experiment investigated whether enhanced learning would be observed for novel stimuli that are more similar than marsupials to those traditionally believed to be fear-relevant. Vicarious learning research that has looked at fear-relevancy effects has used stimuli such as spiders and snakes as their fear-relevant stimuli. However, children will have prior experience with these animals and their baseline fear beliefs for them are not likely to be neutral. As such, using these stimuli may confound stimulus novelty with stimulus fear-relevancy. It is interesting then to investigate vicarious fear learning for fear-relevant stimuli with which children are less familiar. In general, fear-relevance appears to be associated with perceptual characteristics of animals such as sliminess and ugliness (Bennett-Levy & Marteau, 1984) . When Davey (1994) ranked U.K. adults' self-reported fears for indigenous animals, small furry animals such as the squirrel, guinea pig, and rabbit (except for rats and mice) tended to be at the bottom of the list. Invertebrates that were slimy and suggestive of mucus or feces, such as slugs, snakes, eels, and worms, were among the most feared animals. Consequently, two caterpillars (the automeris and nymphalis) that U.K. children were unlikely to know were chosen as fear-relevant stimuli in Experiment 2.
Method
Participants. Fifty-nine children (36 boys, 23 girls) aged 6.58 years to 11.58 years (M ϭ 8.96 years, SD ϭ 17.53 months) were recruited from primary schools in the London area. Children were This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
randomly assigned to the marsupial (n ϭ 30, 11 girls, 19 boys) or caterpillar (n ϭ 29, 12 girls, 17 boys) conditions. Materials.
Marsupials and caterpillars.
Quoll and cuscus pictures from Experiment 1 were used again in Experiment 2. Fear-relevant CSs were six color pictures of two caterpillars (all between 400 ϫ 210 and 400 ϫ 320 pixels): three pictures of an automeris and three of a nymphalis caterpillar.
Fear Beliefs Questionnaire. The FBQ was identical to Experiment 1 except that flower names were replaced with names of caterpillars. Level of internal consistency before learning was indicated by Cronbach's alpha ϭ .71 (Cuscus subscale), .74 (Quoll subscale), .70 (Automeris subscale) and .55 (Nymphalis subscale); level after learning, ␣ ϭ .79, .69, .65, and .68, respectively.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 except that caterpillars were used instead of flowers. Also, nature reserve task measurements were taken individually for each CS in Experiment 2 to ensure that scores were independent of each other. Consequently only one marsupial or caterpillar was on the board when each child positioned his or her figure, instead of both simultaneously as in Experiment 1.
Results
Fear beliefs. Prelearning fear beliefs were compared using a 2 (pairing type: scared-paired vs. unpaired) ϫ 2 (CS type: marsupial vs. caterpillar) mixed ANOVA. No significant differences were found in fear beliefs for marsupials and caterpillars before vicarious learning. Figure 3 shows mean changes in fear beliefs for marsupials and caterpillars. A two-way 2 (pairing type: scaredpaired vs. unpaired) ϫ 2 (CS type: marsupial vs. caterpillar) mixed ANOVA conducted on changes in average fear belief scores for animals revealed a significant main effect of pairing type, F(1, 57) ϭ 4.97, p ϭ .030, r ϭ .28. This result demonstrates that vicarious learning had a significant effect on fear beliefs: greater increases in fear beliefs were observed for scared-paired CSs (baseline: M ϭ 1.94, SD ϭ 0.78; postlearning: M ϭ 2.30, SD ϭ 0.79) compared to unpaired CSs (baseline: M ϭ 1.95, SD ϭ 0.73; postlearning: M ϭ 2.07, SD ϭ 0.73). The main effect of pairing type, F(1, 57) ϭ 0.09, p ϭ .77, r ϭ .04, and the pairing type ϫ CS type interaction, F(1, 57) ϭ 0.03, p ϭ .88, r ϭ .02, were nonsignificant. This lack of significant interaction indicates that vicarious learning did not differ for marsupials and caterpillars. The effect size for the interaction was very close to zero, indicating a trivial effect. Finally, no relationship between the age of children and increases in fear beliefs for scared-paired marsupials or scaredpaired caterpillars was found (r ϭ .13 and .15, respectively).
Avoidance preferences. Figure 4 shows the mean distances (cm) children placed their figures from each marsupial or caterpillar. The two-way 2 (pairing type: scared-paired vs. unpaired) ϫ 2 (CS type: marsupial vs. caterpillar) mixed ANOVA showed a significant effect of pairing type, F(1, 57) ϭ 8.82, p ϭ .004, r ϭ .37, but the main effect of CS type, F(1, 57) ϭ 0.03, p ϭ .87, r ϭ .02, and the pairing type ϫ CS type interaction were nonsignificant, F(1, 57) ϭ 0.04, p ϭ .85, r ϭ .03. Thus distance between This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
children's figures and a CS (i.e., avoidance) was greater when the CS had been presented with scared faces (M ϭ 33.20, SD ϭ 15.98) than when it had been presented alone (M ϭ 28.76, SD ϭ 13.83), and this effect was similar for marsupials and caterpillars. The effect size for the interaction was again close to zero, indicating a practically nonexistent effect. A correlational analysis found no relationship between children's age and avoidance of marsupials, r ϭ Ϫ.23, but the correlation was approaching significance for caterpillars, r(27) ϭ Ϫ.35, p ϭ .065, suggesting a trend for greater avoidance in younger children.
Experiment 3
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that vicarious learning of fear in children is similar for three types of stimuli: flowers, marsupials, and caterpillars, which vary in level of fear-relevancy. These stimuli were used because U.K. schoolchildren are unlikely to already have high fear beliefs for them. However, although flowers are commonly used fear-irrelevant stimuli, nothing is known about the fear-relevance of the caterpillars apart from their visual similarities with fear-relevant invertebrate stimuli. It remains possible therefore that these stimuli are not fear-relevant enough to elicit enhanced fear-related learning. Although snakes are more typical fear-relevant stimuli in learning studies, they are already so familiar to schoolchildren that even novel species are likely to elicit fear beliefs and avoidance behavior prior to the experiment. Thus fear beliefs questionnaire scores could potentially show ceiling effects following vicarious learning. In Experiment 3, vicarious learning for marsupials and snakes was compared using a series of newly created fear response measures calibrated to avoid ceiling effects. In addition, learning was compared to a third stimulus-type, worms. Worms are visually similar to snakes but not typically used as fear-relevant stimuli in learning experiments.
Method
Participants. Eighty-two children (43 boys, 39 girls) aged 6.29 years to 9.73 years (M ϭ 103.46 months, SD ϭ 8.13 months) were recruited from primary schools in Suffolk and Essex, U.K. Children were randomly assigned to the marsupial (n ϭ 28, 11 girls, 17 boys), snake (n ϭ 28, 13 girls, 15 boys), or worm (n ϭ 26, 15 girls, 11 boys) conditions. Materials. Marsupials, worms, and snakes. Quoll and cuscus pictures from Experiments 1 and 2 were used again in Experiment 3. Fear-relevant CSs were six color pictures of two snakes: three pictures of a keelback snake and three of a boomslang snake. Additional CSs were six color pictures of two worms: three pictures of a Lumbricus rubellus (shortened to "Lumbricus") and an Allolobophora Chlorotica (shortened to "Allolobophora").
Fear Beliefs Questionnaire. The FBQ was identical to the one in Experiments 1 and 2 except that there were three versions for marsupials, snakes, and worms. Internal consistency before learning was indicated by Cronbach's alpha ϭ .71 (Quoll subscale), .73 (Cuscus subscale), .80 (Lumbirucs subscale), .82 (Allolobophora subscale), .83 (Keelback subscale) and .82 (Boomslang subscale); after learning was ␣ ϭ . 83, .82, .79, .87, .93, and .94, respectively. Cognitive, behavioral, and physiological fear responses. A potential problem with using the FBQ to measure fear beliefs for snakes could be baseline levels of fear already being at the top end of the scale, meaning that an increase from baseline cannot be detected. To avoid this possibility, three additional cognitive, behavioral, and physiological self-report measures of fear were used, which were designed to give a more finely calibrated scale and a higher overall ceiling. The three measures were created to reflect Lang's (1968) three anxiety response systems: language behavior, overt behavior, and physiological responses. Each questionnaire consisted of six graded questions to which children could respond on the same 5-point scale used in the FBQ. Questions on the behavioral scale began with, "If you knew there was a room nearby with a [the stimulus animal] in a large closed glass box, would you be able to walk into the room?", followed by questions about whether children would be able to stay in the room, touch the glass of the box, put their hand in the box but not touch the animal, touch the animal, and finally whether they would lift the animal out of the box. Higher scores indicated more approach behavior and lower scores more avoidance. For the cognitive scale, the questions followed the same graded format, but this time asked if children would feel scared in each of the scenarios. Higher scores indicated more fear cognitions. Finally, questions on the physiological scale asked children whether their heart would beat faster in each scenario, with higher final scores indicating greater selfreported physiological fear.
Internal consistency was high for all scales. Before learning levels were, for the Procedure. The procedure followed the same design as Experiments 1 and 2 except that marsupials, worms, and snakes were used instead of marsupials and caterpillars or flowers. A new program, custom written (by the fourth author), was created in E-Prime and run on a Samsung RF511 laptop computer and a ProLite T2451MTS 24Љ touchscreen monitor. The nature reserve task was procedurally the same as previous experiments, but used the new animals.
Results
Fear beliefs. Prelearning fear-belief scores for children in the snake CS group indicated that there was still room on the scale for average fear beliefs to increase due to learning: for the scaredpaired snake, 42.9% of children responded on average at or below 2, the midpoint of the scale; 32.1% responded between 2 and 3; and 25.0% responded from 3 to 4. No children used 4, the highest point on the scale. For the unpaired snake, 50.0% of children responded on the lower part of the scale on average, 25.0% responded from 2 to 3, and 25.0% responded between 3 and 4. Only one child responded using the highest point of the scale prelearning. A two-way independent ANOVA conducted on fearbelief scores before vicarious learning indicated a main effect of This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
animal type, F(2, 79) ϭ 5.49, p ϭ .006, p 2 ϭ .12. Follow-up Bonferroni-adjusted comparisons indicated children's fear beliefs were significantly higher for snakes (M ϭ 2.29, SE ϭ 0.15) than both marsupials (M ϭ 1.74, SE ϭ 0.15) and worms (M ϭ 1.63, SE ϭ 0.15). There was no significant difference in fear beliefs for marsupials and worms.
Mean changes in fear beliefs for marsupials, snakes, and worms are displayed in Figure 5 . A two-way 2 (pairing type: scared-paired vs. unpaired) ϫ 3 (CS type: marsupial vs. snake vs. worm) mixed ANOVA conducted on the changes in average fear-belief scores for the three animals indicated a significant main effect of pairing type, F(1, 79) ϭ 18.05, p Ͻ .001, r ϭ .43. This shows that vicarious learning resulted in a significant increase in fear beliefs for scared-paired CSs (baseline: M ϭ 1.89, SD ϭ 0.86; postlearning: M ϭ 2.20, SD ϭ 1.01) compared to unpaired CSs (baseline: M ϭ 1.89, SD ϭ 0.92; postlearning: M ϭ 1.84, SD ϭ 0.99). The main effect of CS type, F(2, 79) ϭ 2.19, p ϭ .118, p 2 ϭ .053, was nonsignificant, but the pairing type ϫ CS type interaction, F(2, 79) ϭ 3.87, p ϭ .025, p 2 ϭ .089, was significant, indicating different fear-related learning for marsupials, snakes, and worms. The pairing type x CS type interaction was followed up with simple effects analysis comparing changes in fear beliefs for scared-paired and unpaired animals in each group. Results indicated a significant increase in fear beliefs for scared-paired marsupials, F(1, 79) ϭ 21.93, p Ͻ .001, r ϭ .47, and a marginally significant increase for scared-paired snakes, F(1, 79) ϭ 3.89, p ϭ .052, r ϭ .22, but no significant increase for scared-paired worms, F(1, 79) ϭ 0.59, p ϭ .45, r ϭ .09, compared to unpaired animals.
A final correlational analysis indicated that there was a borderline significant correlation between increased age and increases in children's fear beliefs for scared-paired marsupials, r ϭ .36, p ϭ .063, but not snakes, r ϭ Ϫ.01, or worms, r ϭ Ϫ.26.
Self-reported fear cognitions.
For scared-paired snakes previcarious learning, 57% of children responded on average on the lower half (0 to 2) of the 5-point scale; 10.7% responded between 2 and 3; and 32.8% of children responded 3 to 4. Only two children responded with the highest possible average score on the scale of 4. For unpaired snakes, 53.6% responded below the midpoint, 21.4% responded 2-3, and 25.0% responded higher than 3. Four of the 28 children used the highest point on the scale. Thus, across children in the snake group, there was still room on the scale for fear cognitions to increase. Before vicarious learning there was a significant difference in children's fear cognitions for the three CSs, F(2, 79) Mean changes in fear cognitions over time are displayed in Figure 6 , with higher scores indicating more fear cognitions. Mixed ANOVA showed a significant main effect of pairing type, F(1, 79) ϭ 29.01, p Ͻ .001, r ϭ .52, indicating that vicarious learning significantly increased cognitive fear for scared-paired CSs (baseline: M ϭ 1.54, SD ϭ 1.17; postlearning: M ϭ 2.21, SD ϭ 1.26) compared to unpaired CSs (baseline: M ϭ 1.63, SD ϭ 1.28; postlearning: M ϭ 1.66, SD ϭ 1.25). The main effect of CS type was nonsignificant, F(1, 79) ϭ .19, p ϭ .83, r ϭ .05, but the pairing type ϫ CS type interaction was significant, F(2, 79) ϭ 3.81, p ϭ .026, p 2 ϭ .09, indicating different changes in fear cognitions for marsupials, snakes, and worms. As for fear beliefs, simple effects analysis indicated a significantly greater increase in fear cognitions for scared-paired marsupials, F(1, 79) ϭ 29.26, p Ͻ .001, r ϭ .52, and snakes, F(1, 79) ϭ 4.99, p ϭ .028, r ϭ .24, compared to unpaired animals, but for worms this difference was only approaching significance, F(1, 79) ϭ 3.02, p ϭ .086, r ϭ .19. There was no relationship between age and increases in fear cognitions for scared-paired marsupials, r ϭ .13, snakes, r ϭ .12, or worms, r ϭ Ϫ.03.
Self-reported approach-avoidance. Of children who saw snakes with scared faces, 14.3% scored below 1 on the prelearning approach-avoidance scale; 32.1% responded below the midpoint; 42.9% responded from 2 to 3; and 25% responded higher than 3. Only three children (10.7%) used the highest approach point on the scale and no children used the lowest point, suggesting that across the group as a whole there was still room on the scale for approach to increase or decrease. This was similar for unpaired snakes: 50% of children responded below the midpoint of the scale; 28.6% responded from 2 to 3; and 21.4% above 4. Four out of 28 children used the highest point on the scale and no one used the lowest point. A two-way 2 (pairing type: scared-paired vs. unpaired) ϫ 3 (CS type: marsupial vs. snake vs. worm) mixed ANOVA performed on baseline behavioral scale scores found no significant difference in children's self-reported approach-avoidance intentions for marsupials, snakes, and worms before vicarious learning, F(2, 79) ϭ 1.58, p ϭ .21, p 2 ϭ .04. Mean changes in self-reported approach-avoidance intentions for marsupials, snakes, and worms are shown in Figure 6 . Positive scores indicate increases in approach behavior and negative scores indicate increased avoidance. A two-way 2 (pairing type: scaredpaired vs. unpaired) ϫ 3 (CS type: marsupial vs. snake vs. worm) mixed ANOVA conducted on changes in average self-reported approach-avoidance intentions for the three animals indicated a This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
significant main effect of pairing type, F(1, 79) ϭ 26.92, p Ͻ .001, r ϭ .50. This effect shows that vicarious learning resulted in increased avoidance intentions (decreased approach) for scaredpaired CSs (baseline: M ϭ 2.54, SD ϭ 1.10; postlearning: M ϭ 2.13, SD ϭ 1.13) compared to unpaired CSs (baseline: M ϭ 2.49, SD ϭ 1.21; postlearning: M ϭ 2.62, SD ϭ 1.15). The main effect of CS type, F(2, 79) ϭ 0.66, p ϭ .52, p 2 ϭ .02, was nonsignificant, but the pairing type ϫ CS type interaction, F(2, 79) ϭ 2.81, p ϭ .066, p 2 ϭ .07, was marginally significant, suggesting different self-reported approach-avoidance intentions for marsupials, snakes, and worms. Given that this effect replicated the fear beliefs and fear cognitions data, simple effects analyses were used to compare the change in self-reported approach-avoidance for scared-paired and unpaired animals in each group. Compared to unpaired CSs, significant increases in avoidance intentions were detected for scared-paired marsupials, F(1, 79) ϭ 15.94, p Ͻ .001, r ϭ .41, and snakes, F(1, 79) ϭ 16.48, p Ͻ .001, r ϭ .42, but not worms, F(1, 79) ϭ 1.02, p ϭ .32, r ϭ .11. Thus, the same pattern was observed as for fear beliefs and fear cognitions: fear-related vicarious learning increased children's self-reported avoidance of marsupials and snakes, but not worms. A correlational analysis indicated that there was no relationship between children's age and increases in self-reported approach-avoidance behavior for scaredpaired marsupials, snakes, or worms (r ϭ .10, Ϫ.12, and .05, respectively).
Self-reported physiological responses. For scared-paired snakes, 42.9% of children responded on the lower half of the physiological scale before learning; 35.7% responded from 2 to Ϫ3 on the scale; and 21.4%, above 3. Three out of 28 children responded 4, the highest point on the scale, suggesting there was still adequate room on the scale for self-reported physiological responses to increase. A similar pattern of responding was seen for unpaired snakes: 46.4% scored below the midpoint; 28.6% responded from 2 to 3 on the scale; and 25% scored higher than 3. No children responded 4, the highest point on the scale. An analysis of children's self-reported physiological responses to animals at baseline indicated that children reported greater fearrelated physiological responses to marsupials (M ϭ 2.13, SE ϭ 0.19, p Ͻ .001) and snakes (M ϭ 2.12, SE ϭ 0.19, p ϭ .001) than for worms (M ϭ 1.02, SE ϭ 0.20) before vicarious learning, F(2, 79) ϭ 10.38, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .21. Mean changes in self-reported physiological responses to marsupials, snakes, and worms are displayed in Figure 6 , with higher scores indicating increases in heart rate. A mixed ANOVA conducted on changes in self-reported physiological scores for the three animals demonstrated a significant main effect of pairing type, F(1, 79) ϭ 14.07, p Ͻ .001, r ϭ .39. This indicates that, following vicarious learning, children reported significantly increased heart-rate responses to scared-paired CSs (baseline: M ϭ 1.74, SD ϭ 1.24; postlearning: M ϭ 2.13, SD ϭ 1.25) compared This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
to unpaired CSs (baseline: M ϭ 1.80, SD ϭ 1.16; postlearning: M ϭ 1.67, SD ϭ 1.14). There was no main effect of CS type, F(2, 79) ϭ 0.95, p ϭ .39, p 2 ϭ .02, or pairing type ϫ CS type interaction, F(2, 79) ϭ 1.29, p ϭ .28, p 2 ϭ .03, indicating no difference in self-reported physiological responses to marsupials, snakes, and worms. There was also no relationship between age and increases in self-reported physiological responses to scaredpaired marsupials, snakes, or worms (r ϭ .17, .001, and Ϫ.21, respectively).
Avoidance preferences. The mean distance (cm) children placed their figure from each marsupial, snake, or worm is displayed in Figure 7 . A two-way 2 (pairing type: scared-paired vs. unpaired) ϫ 3 (CS type: marsupial vs. snake vs. worm) mixed ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of pairing type, F(1, 79) ϭ 13.91, p Ͻ .001, r ϭ .39, but the main effect of CS type, F(2, 79) ϭ 0.82, p ϭ .44, p 2 ϭ .02, and the pairing type ϫ CS type interaction were nonsignificant, F(2, 79) ϭ 0.11, p ϭ .90, p 2 ϭ .003. Children placed their figures farther away from scaredpaired CSs (M ϭ 29.61, SD ϭ 18.83) than from unpaired CSs (M ϭ 23.87, SD ϭ 17.22), showing fear-related vicarious learning increased avoidance preferences. The nonsignificant interaction indicated that the effect of vicarious learning on avoidance preferences was similar for marsupials, snakes, and worms. Finally, no relationship between age and avoidance preferences for scaredpaired marsupials, snakes, or worms (r ϭ .19, .22, and .11, respectively) was found.
Discussion
Three experiments replicated Askew and Field's (2007; finding that children's self-reported fear beliefs increase for stimuli they see with scared faces: observing someone respond fearfully to a stimulus is sufficient to increase children's fear cognitions for it. Children also preferred to avoid these scaredpaired stimuli compared to unpaired stimuli. This second finding suggests that behavioral avoidance of scared-paired animals, as demonstrated by Askew and Field (2007) , is preceded and/or accompanied by cognitions about avoidance intentions. Most striking was that vicarious fear learning was generally independent of stimulus fear-relevance: children's learning was similar for flowers, marsupials, caterpillars, and snakes. Only learning for worm stimuli differed from marsupials and only on some measures: increases in fear beliefs, fear-related cognitions, and self-reported approach-avoidance were greater for marsupial and snake stimuli than for worms, which showed no vicarious learning on these measures. However, significant increases in self-reported physiological responses and avoidance preferences were observed for scared-paired worms that were no less than for scared-paired marsupials and snakes.
Of course, interpreting nonsignificance as evidence that vicarious learning is not affected by the type of CS can be problematic because there could be other reasons for the lack of significance (e.g., insufficient power). However, effect sizes for the key pairing type ϫ CS type interactions were consistently close to zero. Although the precision of these effect-size estimates will be affected by sample size, with Ns of around 50 -60, the estimates are precise enough to interpret confidently. The estimates clearly indicate that any differences in conditioned responses across different stimuli were close to zero, and should be considered trivial at best.
These results mirror those from toddlers (Dubi et al., 2008) , but are inconsistent with evidence from conditioning procedures with adults using direct aversive USs (see Davey, 1995; McNally, 1987; Mineka & Öhman, 2002; Öhman & Mineka, 2001 ) and vicarious learning in monkeys (Cook & Mineka, 1989 , 1990 , which show selective associations for fear-relevant stimuli. The most straightforward explanation for this is that, unlike adults or monkeys, young children do not show enhanced vicarious learning for fearrelevant stimuli compared to other stimuli. This might, for example, be the case if fear-relevance and selective associations in fact reflect common life experiences rather than biological preparedness. In this scenario, laboratory demonstrations of selective associations may not be due to evolutionary pressures but to participants' previous experience with a stimulus and its personal relevance (Davey, 1992 (Davey, , 1995 Purkis, Lester, & Field, 2011; Purkis & Lipp, 2007 . Davey (1992 Davey ( , 1995 has argued that the uneven distribution of fears can be explained by expectancy evaluations about a learning event. A CR is mediated by the strength of association between the CS and US (Rescorla, 1980) . This association is in turn influenced by the degree to which an individual believes the CS predicts the US (Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984) . So an individual's prior beliefs or "expectancies" about the relationship between a stimulus and a negative outcome could create selective learning effects in the laboratory. But we would not expect to find selective associations for novel stimuli such as those used in the current study unless they are biologically prepared.
Evidence of selective associations for familiar fear-relevant stimuli could be due then either to biological preparedness or past learning experiences. Little evidence for selective associations in vicarious learning was found for fear-relevant stimuli in the current study. Hence the findings contradict a preparedness explanation for selective association but not an experiential explanation. However, there are two possible alternative explanations for the current findings that should also be discussed. These are: 1) the measures used were not sensitive enough to detect differences in learning for the stimuli; and 2) the CSs were not sufficiently fear-relevant. The first of these seems an unlikely interpretation for This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
two reasons. As this article has already noted, effect sizes for comparisons of fear beliefs (r ϭ .07 and .02) and avoidance (r ϭ .02 and .03) for the CSs in Experiments 1 and 2 were extremely small; and much smaller than comparisons between scared-paired and unpaired conditions using these same measures (fear beliefs: r ϭ .37 and .28; avoidance: r ϭ .66 and .37). Furthermore, there was no evidence of ceiling effects: there was ample room on both ends of the fear beliefs and avoidance scales for mean responses to increase or decrease further. Lang (1968) conceptualized anxiety as three response systems: language behavior (subjective report), overt behavior (avoidance), and physiological responses. These systems are relatively independent from each other and there is often little correlation between measures of each index. The current study used self-report measures, whereas monkey (Cook & Mineka, 1989 , 1990 ) and toddler (Dubi et al., 2008) studies have usually observed fear-related behavior, and human conditioning studies have typically used physiological responses or self-report (e.g., Öhman & Soares, 1998) . As a result, differences in findings between these studies might in part reflect differences in measures. The second alternative explanation for the results could be that the stimuli used were not sufficiently fear-relevant. The caterpillars were chosen for the current study on the basis that they were fear-relevant and novel (i.e., unusual in the U.K. and unknown to children). The fear-relevance of a stimulus is usually defined retrospectively though-a stimulus is typically considered fearrelevant if it is feared more often than other stimuli-and is therefore difficult to determine for less well-known stimuli. The caterpillars were chosen because they share perceptual characteristics-that is, they are slimy like mucus or feces-with some commonly feared animals, for example, slugs, snakes, eels, and worms (Bennett-Levy & Marteau, 1984; Davey, 1994) . As such, they were believed to be both novel and fear-relevant. However, due to the circular nature of the definition of fear-relevance, it is not possible to simultaneously demonstrate the fear-relevance of a stimulus and that selective associations do not occur for it because selective associations are assumed to be a feature of fear-relevance: a stimulus is fear-relevant if selective associations are observed; if they are not observed, the stimulus is not fearrelevant. Nevertheless, findings from Experiment 2 suggest that a novel stimulus can share perceptual characteristics with fearrelevant stimuli but not form selective associations.
Because the fear-relevance of caterpillars is not established, Experiment 3 compared fear-related learning in response to marsupials to that in response to snakes and worms: Snakes are well-established fear-relevant stimuli (e.g., Cook & Mineka, 1989) and worms share some perceptual similarities with snakes. Children's fear-related learning in response to snakes was no different from fear-related learning in response to marsupials, supporting the findings from Experiments 1 and 2. Increases in fear beliefs, fear cognitions, and self-reported avoidance were greater for marsupials and snakes than for worms. However, there could be many reasons for this and it highlights the problems associated with making a priori assumptions about what evolution selects for to define stimuli as fear-relevant in experimental procedures. There may have been less learning for worms because, for example, 6-to 9-year-olds already have stable beliefs about how unthreatening worms are compared to snakes and marsupials. Alternatively, fear learning for marsupials and snakes may be more evolutionarily prepared than for worms because, for example, they are larger, have teeth, and move faster; and evolution is more likely to select for general features such as these than for, say, a specific snake or marsupial fearing system. Or the reasons learning is superior to worms may be different for snakes and marsupials: For example, fear learning might be enhanced for marsupials because they are large and mobile, but enhanced for snakes due to socialization. The problem is that there is no way of knowing which of many possible explanations is more accurate. The picture is further complicated here because children's avoidance preferences for scared-paired worms were no different from those for snakes and marsupials when measured using the nature reserve task. And when they were asked about their physiological responses to the animals, children believed that their heart rate responses to all three animal stimuli had increased similarly following learning. Thus, although findings for worms are not as straightforward as those for the other animals and flowers used, they do not entirely contradict the general finding that learning was no different for stimuli of seemingly greater and lesser fear-relevance.
Aside from fear-relevance, other characteristics of the CS may affect comparisons with studies such as those with monkeys (Cook & Mineka, 1989 , 1990 . Fear of stimuli is associated with perceptions of speediness and suddenness of movement (Bennett-Levy & Marteau, 1984) and young children show a predisposition to associate frightened voices with films of moving snakes, but not with still images of snakes (DeLoache & LoBue, 2009 ). Still CS images were used here. Characteristics of the US also vary across studies. USs in the current experiments (still pictures of faces) were unlikely to be as aversive as USs used in monkey and human conditioning studies that involve moving frightened models. Mineka and Öhman (2002; Öhman & Mineka, 2001 ) have argued that controllability and intensity of the US influence whether emotional (mediated by the amygdala) or cognitive (mediated by the hippocampus) fear learning occurs. Fear-relevant stimuli are believed to trigger what they call the "evolutionary module" and produce emotional fear learning, whereas fear-irrelevant stimuli produce less robust cognitive learning. According to Mineka and Öhman, intense USs may also lead to emotional (fear-relevantlike) learning. In line with Mineka and Öhman's theory, Dubi et al. (2008) speculated that they found no evidence of selective vicarious learning for fear-relevant stimuli because their procedure may tap into general cognitive learning about danger, rather than learning of irrational phobias. This now appears less likely given the replication here and given that, together with the current procedure, vicariously acquired changes in two of Lang's fear systems, avoidance behavior (Askew & Field, 2007; Dubi et al., 2008; Egliston & Rapee, 2007; Gerull & Rapee, 2002) and subjective report (Askew & Field, 2007; , have been demonstrated in children.
Summary
Three experiments confirm that fear-related vicarious learning experiences increase children's fear and avoidance cognitions of a stimulus. In contradiction to preparedness theory, this learning was similar for flowers, marsupials, caterpillars, snakes, and, in some cases, worms, and therefore may be unrelated to stimulus fearrelevance in children of this age. The study also highlights issues around defining and explaining fear-relevance in this type of research. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
